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 3 
Introduction 
 
 
The European leaders who set the euro project into motion at the beginning of 
the 1990s were not naïve. They suspected that ensuring the new currency’s 
viability would require more than an independent central bank and a 
mechanism to enforce budgetary discipline. Most of them were convinced that 
a lasting monetary union was bound to require something more. But they were 
unable to agree on what this ‘something’ was. (…) In the end, the euro’s 
architects made a choice. In the absence of a proper ‘community’ to speak of, 
and in the absence of a European state, each of the participating countries was 
left to face alone the challenges and risks involved in their participation in the 
common currency. - Jean Pisani-Ferry1 
 
The politicians who created the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the early 
1990s are responsible for the design flaws in the monetary union. They have been 
aware of the incompleteness of the monetary union and underestimated the 
consequences of creating a monetary union without an economic and political union. 
 
The mistake was that we expected things to work out eventually. We should 
have taken a few absolutely necessary steps right away. The fact that we have 
not done so is to blame on the politicians of my generation. The euro requires 
living up to a couple of minimal parameters; otherwise things will go wrong. – 
Guy Verhofstadt2 
  
The Eurocrisis has made clear to current politicians that the Economic and Monetary 
Union, as designed in the 1990s, was not viable in the long term. The monetary union 
indeed required something more than just an independent central bank and budgetary 
discipline. When the crisis struck in Greece, Ireland and Portugal, there was an urgent 
need for a stability mechanism to mitigate the economic shock. Macro-economic 
developments should have been monitored better and the financial sector required 
European supervision. The monetary union was in need of an economic union in 
order to function properly and be viable.  
 However, creating a strong economic governing structure to maintain the 
EMU was not the only option available. The monetary union could also be abolished, 
divided in a northern and a southern part, or reduced to a few core members. But 
these options came with a potentially high price, such as the risk of severe panic on 
the financial markets, a drop in consumer confidence and hence another economic 
                                                
1 J. Pisani-Ferry, The Eurocrisis and its aftermath (Oxford, 2014) 33,37. 
2 [Nee, de fout was dat we dachten dat het allemaal wel zou loslopen. We hadden meteen een 
aantal absoluut noodzakelijke stappen moeten zetten. Dat we dat niet gedaan hebben, is de 
schuld van de politici van mijn generatie. Voor een euro moeten een aantal minimale 
parameters worden nageleefd, anders gaat het mis.]; ‘Ik ben even kritisch over Europa als een 
euroscepticus’ NRC Handelsblad (1 Feburary 2014). 
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recession. Some even argued that the European Union would come to en end if the 
Euro was to be abolished – see for example the following quote from Angela Merkel: 
 
Scheitert der Euro, dann scheitert nicht nur das Geld. Dann scheitert mehr. 
Dann scheitert Europa, dann scheitert die Idee der Europäischen Einigung. 3 
 
Once decided that the monetary union had to survive in its current shape, policy-
makers began drafting proposals and legislation to strengthen the economic governing 
structure of the monetary union.4 
 The realization among politicians that the Eurozone needed a strong economic 
structure is in accordance with important theories on economic integration, the 
forming of a currency area and on European integration itself. Standard economic 
integration theory states that economic integration has to follow a specific series of 
steps; and an economic union has to be created before a monetary union. The theory 
of optimum currency area’s (OCA) dictates that countries that form a currency area 
need to adhere to several criteria in order to make the currency union beneficial for its 
members. One of these criteria is a mechanism to mitigate country-specific shocks, 
which requires far-going economic cooperation. 5  The Eurocrisis has provided 
empirical evidence for these two economic theories, making the need for an economic 
union not only a theoretical necessity, but also a realistic inevitability.   
  The decision by policy-makers to create a strong economic governance 
structure to fix the design flaws of the EMU and make the monetary union viable in 
the long term seems to be a logical choice based on economic and integration 
theories. Politicians in the 1990s created a monetary union without the essential 
economic governing structure as set out in the economic theories, which required 
politicians in the 2010s to create some sort of economic union. This decision can even 
be regarded as inevitable and self-evident. Deeper economic integration was needed 
to stabilize the monetary union and prevent the Euro from collapsing – and thereby 
save the whole EU according to some. Politicians who did not want to dissolve the 
Euro, which was most of them except for some extreme right- or left-wing parties, did 
not have a choice but to accept deeper European economic integration. Some 
politicians argued that only a strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
would suffice, but this would not fix all the flaws in the design of the monetary union 
and thus not be sufficient to make the EMU viable in the long term.  
 This situation during the Eurocrisis wherein deeper economic integration (the 
economic union) is needed because of a previous decision (the creation of the 
monetary union) is, according to the European integration theory of neo-
                                                
3 Speech Angela Merkel ‘Karlspreise for Prime-Minister of Poland’ held on May 13, 2010.   
4 See for example: ‘Towards A Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’ by Van Rompuy et 
al. (2012), the ‘Blue Bond Proposal’ by Von Weizsäcker and Delpla (2010) about the creating 
of Eurobonds or ‘Strenghtening Economic Governance in the EU’ drafted a taskforced 
chaired by Van Rompuy (2010). 
5 B. Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Irwin 1961) 3; R. A. Mundell, ‘A Theory 
of Optimum Currency Areas’, The American Economic Review 51.4 (1961) 657-665, 664.  
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functionalism, a classical functional spillover effect. This theory is derived from the 
idea that European integration is not completely controlled by states and politicians, 
but that a previous decision to integrate in one specific field or sector can generate a 
spillover effect and make further integration in other sectors almost an inevitable 
necessity. European integration is in such cases not really a choice, but rather a self-
enforcing process.6 
 So there was a theoretical need for an economic union alongside a monetary 
union and the Eurocrisis has made this theoretical need a realistic inevitability, which 
can be described as a functional spillover effect. But there are other aspects that add 
to the level of inevitability to embark on deeper European integration as well, such as 
the crisis-reform thesis. This theory argues that a crisis makes it possible to 
implement long-standing reforms, because people are willing to accept controversial 
measures in order to solve the crisis.7 Thus the Eurocrisis was a unique opportunity to 
create a stable and viable monetary union. This made embarking on deeper integration 
during the Eurocrisis even more self-evident. Once the crisis would be over, the 
window of opportunity would be closed and reforming the EMU would become much 
more difficult. 
 The inevitability of deeper European integration is a difficult situation for 
politicians since they do not have much of a choice. More importantly however, the 
measures that had to be taken to improve the economic governing structure came with 
a huge price: they involved a substantial shift of sovereignty towards Brussels, they 
required large amounts of taxpayers’ money and they seriously limited the policy-
freedom of the Member States. Furthermore, politicians faced a eurosceptic 
constituency that opposed deeper European integration. Research has shown a 
substantial increase of Euroscepticism among the Dutch in the period 1990-2008, 
which is also shown by the rejection of the European Constitution in a national 
referendum in 2005.8 During the parliamentary elections of 2010, about half of the 
votes were given to parties that professed scepticism towards deeper European 
integration: SP9 (9,8%) PVV (15,4%) and the VVD (20,5%).10 The no-vote in the 
referendum about the Association Agreement with Ukraine of 2016 is another 
example of existing Euroscepticism in the Netherlands. 
                                                
6 B. Rosamond, Theories of European Integration (2000 London) 51, 52; A. Niemann, D, 
Ioannou, European economic integration in times of crisis- a case of neofunctionalism? 
‘Journal of European Public Policy’ 22.2 (2015), 196-218: 212. 
7 A. Boin, P. ‘t Hart, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible? ‘Public 
Administration Review’ 63.5 (2003) 544-553: 545; U. Rosenthal e.a. Managing crisis. 
Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities (Springfield 2001) 235. 
8 M. Lubbers, E. Jasper, A longitudinal study of euroscepticisim in the Netherlands: 2008 
versus 1990 in: European Union Politics, digital publication (2011), 16. 
9 An overview of party abbreviations and polticial thought is included in the appendix. 
10 Press release Kiesraad ‘Uitslag verkiezingen leden Tweede Kamer van 9 juni 2010’ 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110721125851/http://www.kiesraad.nl/nl/Actueel/Nieuwsberic
hten/%282047%29-Actueel-Nieuwsberichten-
2010/Uitslag_verkiezing_leden_Tweede_Kamer_van_9_juni_2010.html  
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 As a result, policy-makers faced a major dilemma. On the one hand, deeper 
economic integration was needed - even inevitable -, leading to a situation wherein 
politicians had to agree to transferring sovereignty towards Brussels and losing 
policy-freedom, while on the other hand a large part of the Dutch constituents were 
very sceptical or opposed towards deeper European integration. Transferring 
sovereignty, limiting policy freedom and lending taxpayers’ money are in itself 
measures that should not be taken lightly, but especially not with a population that is 
not in favour of such measures. For politicians, who are elected by the constituents to 
represent their interests, this is a very difficult situation to deal with. 
 There has not been any research done on how national politicians dealt with 
this situation, wherein on the one hand there is a strong need to fix the Economic and 
Monetary Union at the cost of losing sovereignty and policy freedom, but on the other 
hand they had to cope with a very sceptical constituency. Therefore, this thesis will 
examine this dilemma more closely and examine how Dutch political parties have 
dealt with the need to create an economic union at the cost of transferring sovereignty 
towards the European Union. Comparable research has to be done on other Member 
States in order to be able to compare the outcome of researches and come to new 
conclusions. The scope of this thesis is too limited to do so.  
 The most far-reaching measures taken to strengthen the economic governance 
structure of the monetary union, are the measures that involve the monitoring of 
macro-economic developments – and hence these measures create the largest 
dilemma for policy-makers. The Fiscal Compact is far-reaching as well, but it is 
basically a strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact and therefore in itself less 
controversial. Another measure taken that comes to mind is the creation of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Even though this measure includes a lot of 
taxpayer’s money, it does not limit policy freedom or involve a transfer of 
sovereignty. Contrary to the Fiscal Compact and the ESM, the monitoring of macro-
economic developments was something new and has an effect on the policy freedom 
of Member States.  
 Therefore this thesis focuses on the introduction of the Europact and the 
Macro-economic Imbalances Procedure (MIP). The Europact is an agreement 
between the Member States that focuses on improving competitiveness of the 
Member States, which will be achieved by monitoring and correcting macro-
economic developments. The Europact is based on soft law. The MIP - which is part 
of the Sixpack, a package of measures to improve the economic structure of the 
monetary union – monitors and corrects macro-economic developments too, but it has 
a stronger mechanism to force Member States to correct any imbalances. Both the 
Europact and the MIP will be explained to a larger extend in the next chapter. 
 Important to note at this moment, is that the MIP, and the Europact to a lesser 
extent, seriously eroded national sovereignty, limited policy freedom in important 
socio-economic issues and thereby increased the democratic deficit. Due to sceptical 
constituents all across Europe, embarking on deeper economic integration was rather 
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controversial.11 Also the monitoring of macro-economic developments itself has been 
criticized. Some scholars, for example, argued that the focus on the deficits is too 
strong and the focus on surpluses is not sufficient, which are both worrisome since 
they are related to each other.12 Others pointed out that governments have little 
control over many variables that are involved in macro-economic developments, or 
some even regarded the MIP as weak and insufficient.13  
 This thesis will analyse the content of parliamentary debates in order to shed 
light on how Dutch politicians on the national level dealt with the introduction of 
Europact and the MIP. The aim is to construct an analytical explanation of the 
debates, which is basically a historical narrative, couched into a theoretical 
framework. Such an analysis is based upon a couple of cases that are of importance 
for the analytical explanation, which in this research are the Europact and the MIP.14  
 
The question that this thesis will answer is the following: 
 
How did Dutch political parties in parliament deal with the introduction of the 
Europact and the Macro-economic Imbalances Procedure at the cost of losing 
sovereignty and policy-freedom?  
 
The decision-making process of the Europact and MIP mainly took place in 2011. In 
September 2010, the Sixpack was introduced and in March 2011 the Economic and 
Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and the European Council agreed upon it. As a 
consequence, most of the debates about the Sixpack took place in March 2011. The 
Sixpack was agreed upon by the European Parliament in September 2011 and entered 
into force three months later. Important to note is that the Europact had been agreed 
upon in early March 2011 as well, causing some overlap in the debates held in the 
Dutch parliament. However, if a politician is opposed to the Europact because he is 
opposed to interference from Brussels on macro-economic developments, he will also 
be opposed to the Sixpack and vice versa.  
 This thesis is based on the minutes of parliamentary debates held in the 
Netherlands. One of the main tasks of a Member of Parliament is to control the 
government and hold ministers accountable for their actions. This led to debates and 
discussions that are a rich source of information and gives an insight in the viewpoints 
of politicians and government. Furthermore, these minutes are easily accessible and 
are in most cases the best available option to investigate party views. 2011 is very 
                                                
11 ‘An ever-deeper democratic deficit’ The Economist – 26 May 2012; ‘De democratie wordt 
geofferd op het altaar van de muntunie’ DeVolkskrant (20 December 2013).  
12 The Eurocrisis and Germany’s collective denial of the truth (20 February 2015) on: 
http://www.flassbeck-economics.de/the-euro-crisis-and-germanys-collective-denial-of-the-
truth/  
13 P. de Grauwe, The Governance of a Fragile Eurozone, CEPS Working Document no346 
(2011) 16; A. Sapir, G. B. Wolff, Euro-area governance: what to reform and how to do it. 
Breugel Policy Brief (2015, nr.1). 
14A.L. George, A. Bennett, Case studies and theory development in the social sciences 
(Cambridge, MA 2005) 221. 
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recent and there are no bibliographies or ego documents available; getting an 
interview with former ministers and Members of parliament could be possible, but is 
unlikely to succeed. More importantly, interviews have some serious flaws, especially 
while interviewing a politician about how well he did his job a couple of years ago. 
One cannot expect politicians to be fully open and honest about politically sensitive 
topics that could still hurt his or her career or political party. Furthermore, important 
internal documents of political parties and minute meetings of the government are not 
available yet and will not be for another twenty years. Another interesting source to 
examine the viewpoints of political parties are party manifestos. However, the party 
manifestos of the Dutch general elections of 2010 do not provide sufficient 
information for this thesis. The manifestos of the main parties – VVD, CDA, PvdA, 
PVV, SP, GroenLinks – do not even mention definitions like ‘monetary union’, 
‘macro-economic developments/imbalances’, ‘sixpack’ or ‘Europact’. Only D66 
mentions the monetary union once. The manifestos are very general about being in 
favour or against European cooperation and have a stronger focus on fiscal 
consolidation.15 
 The use of minutes of parliamentary meetings has some downsides as well. 
Not always do politicians debate an issue as extensively as you might want them to 
do. A debate held in parliament is usually about a few topics, ranging from the 
Eurocrisis to a climate conference, and from migration to the unrest in the Middle 
East. All these topics need to be discussed in a relative limited amount of time, which 
in some cases leads to a politician saying only a few brief sentences about the topic of 
the research. Thus even though, in general, minutes are a rich source of information, 
there is always the possibility that a particular subject has not been debated 
extensively. This had been the case for this thesis as well, although the content has 
proven to be sufficient to use. However, the time spent by a politician on a specific 
issue also tells us something about how important the issue is in the eyes of that 
politician.  
 In addition to the minutes of Dutch parliamentary debates, other sources are 
used in this research as well. Letters from ministers are used to examine how 
politicians have been informed. The conclusions and statements from meetings on the 
European level (e.g. European Council, Ecofin, Eurogroup) are examined to 
determine what was being agreed upon or discussed in Brussels. Furthermore, the 
proposals for the Europact and Sixpack have been used to research the content of the 
measures and to determine which information was available for politicians.  
 The theories of economic integration, neo-functionalism and the crisis-reform 
thesis do not only help to explain the relevance of this research; they will also 
                                                
15 VVD, Orde op zaken, verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010); CDA, Slagvaardig en 
samen, verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010); PvdA, Iedereen telt mee. De kracht van 
Nederland, verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010); PVV, Een agenda van hoop en 
optimisme. Een tijd om te kiezen: PVV 2010-2015, verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010); 
SP, Een beter Nederland voor minder geld, verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010); 
GroenLinks, Klaar voor de toekomst, verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010); D66, We 
willen het anders. verkiezingsprogramma 2010-2015 (2010) 31. 
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function as a theoretical framework in which the analyses will be conducted. The first 
chapter will provide deeper insight into the theories and outline the context in which 
the introduction of the Europact and the MIP took place. The second chapter gives an 
overview of the debates that are used and places them in the timeline of the decision-
making process. The third chapter forms the first part of the empirical research and 
examines to what extent politicians have accepted the need of deeper economic 
integration to make the monetary union viable and stable. The fourth chapter deals 
with the question whether politicians saw the Eurocrisis as an opportunity to reform 
and embark on deeper integration. The last chapter and third part of the empirical 
research examines to what extent politicians have been aware of the content of the 
Europact and the MIP and whether they were aware of the costs and consequences 
involved.  
 
 
Chapter 1. Theoretical framework and context 
 
This chapter will provide the essential information to fully understand this research 
and the decision-making process regarding the Europact and the MIP. First, the 
creation of the Economic and Monetary Union, including the design flaws, will be 
discussed. This is followed by the crisis-reform thesis that outlines how the Eurocrisis 
creates opportunity to reform. The fourth paragraph discusses the theory of neo-
functionalism and the spillover effect. Next, there is a paragraph about the content of 
the Europact and the MIP, followed by the legal status of the measures and the role of 
a national parliament in the decision-making process. The last part of this chapter 
deals with the viewpoint of the Dutch government regarding the Europact and MIP.  
 
1.1 The creation of the EMU and its design flaws 
While researching the design flaws in the monetary union and the measures taken to 
fix these flaws, it is important to take into account that the creation of the monetary 
union was not in accordance with standard economic theory. B. Balassa, one of the 
economists who developed the theory on economic integration, argued that there are 
certain steps in economic integration that need to be followed in order to make the 
integration process successful.16 The European Union did not follow these steps one 
by one, since it created a monetary union without a proper economic union. The 
Eurocrisis seems to prove the theory right, since the EMU did not function well due to 
the lack of a strong economic governing structure. More importantly however, the 
Eurozone does not form an optimum currency area, as defined by Mundel and others. 
The optimum currency area theory dictates a set of criteria to which countries have to 
adhere in order for a currency union to be viable. The Eurozone does not adhere to all 
of these criteria and should, according to this theory, not form a currency union. One 
                                                
16 Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, 3. 
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of the criteria is a mechanism to mitigate country-specific shocks, which can be 
created in the form of a large European budget or a rescue fund.17 
 Politicians in the 1990s decided to create a monetary union without an 
economic union or a strong economic governing structure. In general there was 
insufficient attention to macro-economic developments, as will be discussed later on. 
Furthermore, politicians underestimated the construction and risks of creating a 
monetary union and expected things to work out eventually.18 This resulted in some 
serious flaws in the design of the monetary union that affected Europe during the 
Eurocrisis, as will be discussed later on.  
 While designing the monetary union, policy makers had a strong focus on 
monetary and fiscal policies. The monetary union was designed to achieve two 
objectives: price stability and the solvency of national public sectors.19 The European 
Central Bank (ECB) got the main objective to maintain price stability and budgetary 
surveillance had been set out in the Stability and Growth Pact. However, there was no 
attention for macro-economic developments of the economies of the Member States, 
which is regarded as a first design flaw and is most relevant for this thesis.20  
 A second flaw in the design is that the EMU did not include a European 
supervisory mechanism for the financial markets. Divergence in the Eurozone is very 
much related to the financial cycle, but this cycle had been neglected. There were 
large financial inflows and credit booms in the peripheral countries such as Spain and 
Ireland, while other countries such as Germany and Austria experienced a much more 
contained financial cycle. The financial crisis caused the financial flows to dry up, 
creating huge problems for the peripheral countries since they were dependant on 
external funding caused by the credit boom.21 
  A third design flaw is a lack of strong mechanisms to enforce compliance with 
the fiscal rules as set out in the Stability and Growth Pact. Both the preventive and 
corrective arm of the SGP were not sufficient due to the intergovernmental structure. 
Member States felt no urge to prevent other Member States from failing to apply with 
the rules. The corrective arm did not function well either since possible sanctions 
were not automatic but required a discretionary decision by the European Council.22 
 The fourth flaw is the lack of a crisis-management mechanism. Countries 
within a monetary union are more vulnerable to a solvency crisis and to being 
speculated into default than when they have their own currency. This vulnerability 
exist, because members of a currency union don’t control the currency in which their 
                                                
17 Mundell, ‘A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas’, 664. 
18 R. Jansen, De Euro. Twintig jaar na het Verdrag van Maastricht (Amsterdam 2012) 91,92; 
‘Ik ben even kritisch over Europa als een euroscepticus’ NRC Handelsblad (2 February 
2014). 
19 M. Obstfeld, Finance at centre stage: some lessons of the Euro crisis, European Economy, 
Economic papers 493 (2013) 25,26. 
20 Obstfeld, Finance at centre stage, 25,26. 
21 J. de Haan, J. Hessel and N. Gilbert, Reforming the Architecture of EMU: Ensuring 
Stability in Europe. DNB Working Paper no 446 (2014) 10-11.  
22 De Haan, Reforming the Architecture of EMU, 6,7. 
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debt is issued.23 Thus while creating a monetary union, one should also include a 
crisis-management mechanism since the chances for crises are larger. However, 
policy-makers in the 1990s did not do so: the ECB is not allowed to act as a lender of 
last resort and Member States are technically not allowed to bail-out other Member 
States.24 
 The design flaws in the monetary union contributed to the depth of the 
Eurocrisis. The lack of a crisis-resolution mechanism made it much more difficult to 
solve the crisis. The weak enforcement of budgetary rules made it possible that 
countries wasted the good times in which deficits and debts should had been reduced. 
The lack of a European surveillance system for the financial sector enhanced the 
divergence and the lack of focus on macro-economic developments led to huge 
difficulties regarding the competitiveness-level.   
 
1.2 The crisis-reform thesis 
The decisions to reform the EMU are taken during the Eurocrisis. Since decision-
making in time of crisis differs from decision-making during a non-crisis period, it is 
important to outline the effects of a crisis on the decision-making process.  
 During a crisis, the voters expect their political leaders to act and return things 
back to normal.25 During an economic crisis, people lose their jobs, might be forced to 
sell their houses and experience a decline in wealth and happiness. The urge for 
politicians to do something is large and the expectations are high. But decision-
making during a crisis is a difficult task. A crisis triggers the attention of the media, 
information is not always accurate and there is rarely unanimity on how to solve the 
crisis. Furthermore, crises can be very complex and difficult to thoroughly 
understand; they can develop and change, requiring the policy response to change as 
well; and they can amplify other problems and create multiple new crises.26  
 An important factor that makes solving a crisis difficult is the fact that 
political structure in European countries is often based on shared power. There is not 
just one actor responsible for one specific crisis, rather there are multiple actors that 
are involved in a crisis. Shared power can be defined as ‘shared capabilities exercised 
in interaction between or among actors to further achievement of their separate and 
joint aims.’27 The Eurocrisis is a good example of this. First of all, the Eurocrisis 
consist of multiple different crises that are the responsibility of different ministers: the 
budget deficit is the responsibility of the minister of finance; unemployment and the 
lack of competitiveness is the responsibility of the minister of economic affairs; and 
agreeing to further European integration is often the responsibility of the heads of 
                                                
23 De Grauwe, The governance of a fragile Eurozone, 2; N. Gilbert, J. Hessel and S. Verkaart, 
Towards a Stable Monetary Union: What Role for Eurobonds, DNB Working Paper no.379 
(2013) 14. 
24 De Haan, Reforming the Architecture of EMU, 15. 
25 Boin, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis, 544. 
26 Boin, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis, 545. 
27 B. Bryson, J. Crosby, Leadership for the common good. Tackling public problems in a 
shared-power world (1992 New York) 13. 
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state. Given the fact that monetary policy is a EU competence, the Eurocrisis is also a 
matter of all the members of the Eurozone.  
 Thus one can argue that making sound decisions in times of crisis is very 
difficult for politicians. However, the crisis-reform thesis points out that a crisis 
provides a window of opportunity as well. The theory argues that a crisis makes it 
possible to reform long-standing policies that in normal times would have been 
impossible to implement. People desire to end the crisis and want things to return 
back to normal, which makes them more willing to accept measures that otherwise 
would be unacceptable.28 
 The crisis-reform thesis therefore argues that the Eurocrisis created an 
opportunity to reform the economic governance structure, which was impossible 
before the crisis. This suggests that politicians deliberately used the Eurocrisis to 
implement measures that they felt like were needed, but in other circumstances were 
impossible. The Eurocrisis thus not only made it clear that deeper integration was 
essential to maintain the EMU – which can be regarded as a functional spillover effect 
from the creation of a monetary union without an economic union – the crisis itself 
created the conditions in which policy-makers were actually able to embark on deeper 
European economic integration.  
 The crisis-reform thesis adds to perception of the inevitability of deeper 
European integration. The theory suggests that the Eurocrisis created the context in 
which long-awaited policies to reform the economic governance structure finally 
could be implemented. The Eurocrisis thus created a unique opportunity. In other 
words: if politicians did not embark on deeper integration to improve the economic 
governance structure and fix the design flaws of the EMU during the crisis, they had 
to wait for a next crisis to be able to do so. The result would be an instable and 
unviable monetary union, threatening the stability of the Eurozone and the European 
Union. This could trigger a new crisis and another loss of welfare and prosperity for 
Europe.  
 
1.3 European integration: Neo-functionalist spillover effect 
The theory of neo-functionalism plays an important role in the introduction of the 
MIP and the Europact because it affects the essence of deepening European 
cooperation. As opposed to Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which argues that 
European integration is driven by states that are rational actors and make decisions 
based on self-interest, 29  the theory of neo-functionalism states that European 
integration is not fully controlled by the Member States. According to neo-
functionalism, a previous decision to integrate in one specific field or sector can 
generate a spillover effect and make further integration in other sectors almost an 
                                                
28 Boin, Public Leadership in Times of Crisis, 545; Rosenthal, Managing crisis, 235. 
29 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina to 
Maastricht (London 1998) 3.  
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inevitable necessity. European integration is in such cases not really a choice, but 
rather a self-enforcing process.30 
 Thus according to the theory of neo-functionalism, the steps taken in 2011 
towards an economic union in order to solve the Eurocrisis and fix the design flaws of 
the monetary – e.g. the introduction of the Europact and MIP – can be be regarded as 
a spillover effect from the earlier decision to create a monetary union without an 
economic union. In this theoretical framework, the Europact and MIP are an 
inevitable consequence rather than a political decision based upon political 
convictions. This adds to the inevitability of deeper economic integration and thereby 
adds to the policy-dilemma faced by national political parties.  
 There is a debate in the literature whether deeper economic integration is a 
spillover effect or not. Some scholars argue that the measures taken are not a spillover 
effect because they strengthen existing policies and do not include a transfer of 
competences towards the European Union. Others argue that the European Council 
played the most important role in solving the crisis and the integration is therefore 
primary driving by Intergovernmentalism. Most other scholars however state that the 
measures taken are actual functional spillover effects, since these were the only viable 
options.31 
 
1.4 The introduction of the Europact and the MIP 
The debates in Dutch parliament about the Europact and Sixpack took place in the 
midst of the Eurocrisis: March 2011. Greece and Ireland had been bailed out already 
and the credit rating agencies were downgrading Portugal’s sovereign credit rating. A 
temporary bailout fund had been created to help the insolvent countries by providing 
liquidity. 
 Germany began to play an essential role in redesigning the economic 
governance structure and fixing the flaws of the monetary union and started to take on 
a leadership role in Europe since its economy was doing relatively well compared to 
the other Member States. The economic thinking in Germany is very sceptical 
towards government intervention in the economy; this leads to an aversion of 
government spending and expansionary monetary policies. Instead, governments 
should embark on sound fiscal policies. This increases market confidence, leading to 
more investment and hence economic growth.32 Germany was only willing to help 
other Member States if they abided by these same principles: 
 
                                                
30 Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, 51, 52.  
31 R.Vilipisuaskas, Eurozone Crisis and European Integration: Functional Spillover, Political 
Spillback? ‘European Integration’ 35.3 (2013) 361-373: 367,368; U. Puetter Europe's 
deliberative intergovernmentalism: the role of the Council and European Council in EU 
economic governance ‘Journal of European Public Policy’ 19.2 (2012) 161-178: 161; P. 
D.Tortola (2015) Coming Full Circle: The Euro Crisis, Integration Theory and the Future of 
the EU ‘The International Spectator’ 50.2 (2015) 125-140: 130; Niemann, European 
economic integration in times of crisis, 212. 
32 S. Dullien, U. Guérot, The Long Shadow of Ordoliberalism: Germanyy’s Approach to the 
Euro Crisis, Policy brief by the European Council on Foreign Relations (2012) 2. 
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Yet it is Germany’s position that there must be a mix of solidarity between, 
and solidity of, all Member States. On this condition, Germany is prepared to 
show solidarity, as we did in many instances last year. – Angela Merkel33 
 
Furthermore, public opinion in Germany was very sceptical towards southern Europe. 
The perception was that other Southern European countries, just like Greece, suffered 
a crisis due to poor policies and bad fiscal behaviour.34  
 So Germany was a proponent of solid policies and regarded the Europact and 
MIP as a way to achieve good governance in those countries that suffered from the 
crisis as a consequence of poor policies. Given the strong position of Germany in 
Europe, this German viewpoint influenced the decision-making process.  
 
1.4.1 Europact 
The official name of the Europact is ‘A pact for the euro. Stronger economic policy 
coordination for competitiveness and convergence’, but it is widely known as the 
Europact, Europlus pact or competitiveness-pact.  
 The main objective of the Europact is to strengthen the economic pillar of the 
monetary union by improving competitiveness among the Member States. The pact 
focuses primarily on policy areas that are national competences and which are 
relevant for competitiveness and avoiding macro-economic imbalances.  
 The pact works as following: the European Council choses a policy area 
wherein common objectives will be agreed upon. The Member States however are 
free to decide upon how to pursue the objective and which policies are used. If, for 
example, the objective is to increase competitiveness, a Member State is free to 
choose whether it will lower wages or invests in research and development to improve 
efficiency. In setting the objectives, the Member States take into account best 
practices and benchmark against the best performer. Each year, the European 
Commission will draft a report that is used by the Council to monitor the progress of 
implementation.35  
 Important to note is that there are no sanctions included if a Member State 
does not meet the objectives that are set. The pact is based upon political commitment 
and can only be enforced by peer pressure; poor results with benchmarking can give a 
Member State an incentive to reform.  
 
1.4.2 Macro-economic Imbalances Procedure 
In October 2010, a taskforce lead by Herman van Rompuy published a report titled 
‘Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU’. This report enhanced six 
                                                
33 Speech Angela Merkel, Adress by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel as part of the 
Singapore Lectures of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (9 June 2011, Singapore), via: 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Reden/2011/2011-06-02-bkin-singapur_en.html 
seen on 04-04-2015. 
34 Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Crisis, 52.  
35 Conclusions of the Heads of State or Government of the Euro Area of 11 March 2011 
(Brussels, 11 March 2011) Annex I: A pact for the euro. Stronger economic policy 
coordination for competitiveness and convergence, 6. 
 15 
regulations/directives to improve the economic governance and became known as the 
Sixpack. The Sixpack actually consist of five pillars: 1) Strengthening of the SGP, 2) 
Macro-Economic Imbalances Procedure, 3) European Semester, 4) the ESM, and 5) 
stronger institutions that provide independent analysis and forecasts.36  
 The report points out that just compliance with the SGP is not sufficient and 
that a mechanism is needed to deal with ‘persistent and large macro-economic 
imbalances and divergences in competitiveness’. The report recommends establishing 
a mechanism alongside the SGP, with a monitoring and a correcting arm. The 
monitoring included annual assessments and a scoreboard. The corrective arm is more 
interesting. If a Member State does not adhere to broad economic guidelines, it may 
receive a warning from the European Commission. If the imbalances get too serious, 
the Council can decide to put the Member State in an ‘excessive imbalances 
procedure’, where after the corrective arm is set in motion. The Member State will 
receive recommendations and is obliged to report on a regular basis on progress of 
implementation. If the Member State is in the monetary union, it can receive sanctions 
if it fails to comply with the recommendations. 37 
 The Macro-economic Imbalances Procedure has the same objective as the 
Europact – the monitoring of macro-economic developments and correcting 
imbalances – but the correcting mechanism is based upon sanctions instead of 
political commitment. This makes a huge difference in the potential consequences for 
the policy-freedom of Member States.  
  
1.5 Legal status of the Europact/Sixpack and the role of the parliament 
The legal status of the Europact and the Sixpack affects the role of the Dutch 
parliament in the decision-making process of these agreements. The Sixpack consist 
out of five regulations and one directive – the MIP are based upon two regulations. 
These legislative acts are created with the ordinary legislative procedure, which is a 
decision-making procedure wherein the European Commission proposes legislation 
and the European Council and European parliament adjust and/or accept the proposed 
legislation. 
 The role of the national parliaments in these legislative acts differs between 
the Member States. In general, governments have to make all Commission proposals 
available to their parliaments in order for parliaments to be able to debate the issue 
before the Council will discuss the proposal. This gives parliaments the opportunity to 
express their opinions and debate on the proposals. The difference between the 
Member States is whether the government is given a mandate from parliament, to 
which it is not allowed to deviate from in Brussels. The Netherlands does not have 
such a mandate-system, which limits the role of the Dutch parliament in the decision-
making process. The best option for the Dutch parliament is to influence the ministers 
or Prime Minister and hence influence European politics.38  
                                                
36 Strengthening Economic Governance in the EU. Final Report of the Task Force to the 
European Council (Brussels, 21 October 2010) 1. 
37 Ibidem, 8,9. 
38 D. Chalmers e.a., European Union Law. Text and Materials (Cambridge 2006) 168-169. 
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 The Europact is agreed upon by the use of the Open Method of Coordination 
(OMC), wherein the heads of state and government agree on matters that do not fall 
within the EU competences. The idea is to set targets and use soft law to make sure 
every Member State meets those targets. The European Council is the main actor and 
in general it formulates policies and monitor progress. 39  The OMC is very 
intergovernmental and the role of national parliaments is limited.40  As always, 
ministers and prime ministers can be held accountable, which is the best option for 
Members of Parliament to influence the decision-making process.  
  This is in accordance with the ‘deparliamentarization thesis’. The general idea 
is that European integration weakens the position of the national parliaments and 
hence increases the democratic deficit.41 Even though the Dutch parliament had no 
direct involvement in the creation of the Europact and Sixpack, it is still very relevant 
to examine parliamentary debates. Parliamentarians are ought to represent the Dutch 
citizens and act on their behalf. Furthermore, they have the obligation to control the 
government and the ability to dismiss a minister or withdraw support for the 
government and force the cabinet to resign. This makes the parliament both important 
and potentially influential.  
 
 
1.6 The political situation in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands has a multi-party system, creating the necessity of forming a 
coalition in order to have a majority in parliament and be able to effectively govern. 
However, after the elections of June 2010, the VVD decided to form a minority 
government with the CDA, which would be supported by the PVV on a couple of 
issues. European integration was not one of them.42 The governing construction 
created a situation wherein the government was dependent on the opposition to find 
agreement on important issues that were not supported by the PVV, as for example 
was the case with the training mission in Kunduz in January 2011 and the budget for 
2013.  
 This let to a situation wherein the government had to be in the good graces of 
the opposition parties, especially D66, GroenLinks, ChristenUnie and SGP, since they 
were the most willing to support the government. Satisfying both the governing and 
the opposition parties seriously limit the ‘win sets’ during the negotiation process in 
Brussels. Robert Putnam argues in his two-game theory that negotiators on an 
international level have certain win sets, which are possible outcomes that are likely 
to be accepted on a domestic level.43 As will be discussed later on, this position of the 
government might have influenced the debate, especially because many opposition 
parties, including ChristenUnie and SGP, were very critical about deeper European 
integration during the Eurocrisis.  
                                                
39 Chalmers, European Union Law, 110. 
40 E. Szyszczak, ‘Experimental Governanve: The Open Method of Coordination’ European 
Law Journal 12.4 (2006) 486-502: 495. 
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42 Gedoogakkoord VVD-PVV-CDA (2010). 
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1.7 The viewpoint of the Dutch government on Europact and the MIP 
The parliamentary debates used for in thesis show that the Dutch government was in 
favour of monitoring macro-economic developments and advocated the introduction 
of the MIP and the Europact in both the national parliament and Brussels.  
 During one of the debates, Minister of Finance Jan-Kees de Jager (CDA) was 
rather outspoken about his successes on influencing European politics and including 
Dutch wishes in the policies. He referred to five demands of the Dutch government, 
which he was able to hold on to during negotiations in Brussels and on which he did 
not had to compromise.44 Interestingly, these five demands cover almost the whole 
economic governance structure in the Eurozone. In the letter De Jager sent earlier to 
parliament, and to which he refers during the debate, he lists five points: the 
strengthening of the Stability and Growth Pact, guidelines for minimum demands for 
budgetary estimates, the macro-economic imbalances procedure, adequate measures 
to guarantee financial stability, and the EFSF/ESM.45  
 This is a clear example of a member of the government very explicitly stating 
that the government is in favour of monitoring macro-economic developments. It also 
indicates that the government pushed for these measures on the European level.  
 
 
Chapter 2. An overview of the debates 
 
Before analysing the content of the parliamentary debates, it is useful to first discuss 
the debates that are used during this research and analyse their position in the 
decision-making procedure. Furthermore, this chapter will be used to discuss what 
issues were on the agenda, what information politicians received and what they could 
have known. Hence this chapter gives a broader context in which the debates can be 
placed and explains the workings of the Dutch parliament.  
 The Sixpack was announced at the end September in 2010. In the following 
six months, the Sixpack was debated among the Member States and finally agreed 
upon in the Council in March 2011. This is the timeframe in which the debates about 
the Sixpack had to take place in Dutch parliament. The Europact was discussed and 
agreed upon by the European Council in March 2011 as well, leading to some overlap 
in the Council meetings and in the debates held in Dutch parliament.  
 Due to the fact that both the Europact and Sixpack were agreed upon in March 
2011, there is a strong focus in this research on the two national debates that are held 
during this month. Two other debates are used as well, one that took place in October 
2010 right after Van Rompuy introduced the Sixpack and the discussion about it 
during a European Council meeting. The other debate took place a couple of months 
after the Council agreed upon the Sixpack and the Europact. This was a general 
                                                
44Handelingen II, 2010-2011 (March 23, 2011) nr.64, item 5 (23 March 2011) 41. 
45 Kamerstukken II, 2010-2011, nr.788, 21 501-07, Brief van de minister van financiën (25 
October 2010) 2-5. 
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debate about ‘the state of the European Union’, which perfectly shows the priorities 
of politicians regarding European policies.  
 
2.1 Debate about the Council meeting, October 2010 
The first European Council meeting held after the announcement of the Van Rompuy-
report took place on the 28th and 29th of October 2010. In the conclusions of this 
meeting, the Council stated the following regarding the Van Rompuy-report: 
  
The European Council endorses the report of the Task Force on economic governance. 
Its implementation will allow us to increase fiscal discipline, broaden economic 
surveillance, deepen coordination, and set up a robust framework for crisis 
management and stronger institutions.46 
 
The European Council literary writes about being in favour of broadening economic 
surveillance and deepening coordination. In the report that the Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs sent to parliament about the Council meeting, he clearly wrote that 
the Van Rompuy-report includes the monitoring of macro-economic developments 
and a better coordination of budgetary and economic policies. He pointed out as well 
that the report had received broad support in the council.47  
 So the Dutch Members of Parliament were informed about the plan to monitor 
macro-economic developments and drive for better economic coordination when they 
debated the council meeting on November 2nd. Even though both the conclusion and 
the letter did not mention the macro-economic imbalances procedure in detail, the 
details of the MIP were already published in the report of Van Rompuy and available 
for politicians. The report proposes that a Member State with particular serious 
imbalances can be placed in an excessive imbalances procedure. This forces the 
Member State to report regularly on the progress and it allows the European 
Commission to monitor the progress and make recommendations. If the Member 
State is a member of the Euro-area, it can receive a sanction ‘in case of repeated non-
compliance with the Council recommendations.’48  
 At this moment in the decision-making process, there were three important 
sources of information: the Van Rompuy report, the conclusion of the Council 
meeting and the letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Despite these sources of 
information, the issue of the macro-economic imbalances procedure and the objective 
of the European Council to broaden economic surveillance and enhance economic 
coordination was barely subject to debate. Just one Member of Parliament – Mr van 
Bommel (SP) - mentioned the MIP, stating that this give Brussels the opportunity to 
strongly interfere in national economies and in the competences of nation states to 
implement their own policies in the field of macro-economic aspects.49 Yet this was 
                                                
46 European Council, Conclusion European Council Meeting 28-29 October 2010 (EUCO 
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just a single statement and did not lead to any responses or discussion. The rest of the 
debate mainly dealt with the budget of the European Union, the matter of automatic 
sanction in the context of the SGP, a permanent rescue mechanism and other non-euro 
related issues such as the climate conference in Cancun.  
 It is noteworthy that no politician, but one, mentioned the Macro-economic 
Imbalances Procedure. In general parliament did not seem to have picked up on the 
MIP and its potential influence at this stage of the decision-making process. Later on, 
before the European Council was about to agree upon the Sixpack, the MIP was more 
thoroughly discussed in parliament.  
 
2.2 Debate about the Eurosummit of March 11 on the Europact and the debate 
of March 23-24 on the Council meeting. 
As already mentioned earlier, the Europact and the Sixpack were debated and agreed 
upon in the same month: March 2011. This created a situation wherein both 
agreements were subject of the two debates that were held in Dutch parliament about 
the Eurocrisis in March. Therefore, this paragraph deals with both of the debates.  
 There are two debates that are of importance, the debate held on March 9 
about the Eurosumit of March 11 and the debate held on March 23 about the 
European Council meeting of March 24 and 25. During the Eurosummit of March 11, 
the heads of state or government of the euro-area agreed upon the Europact. 
Furthermore, they talked about the Sixpack and urged the ministers of finance to 
finalize their work on these six legislative proposals.50 A few days later, on March 14 
and 15, the Eurogroup came together and found common ground on the Sixpack. The 
European Council, meeting on March 24 and 25, was expected to agree upon the 
Sixpack.51   
 Within three weeks times, two pacts to improve the economic governance of 
the monetary union were discussed in three different meetings and both were agreed 
upon in the end. To make things even more complex, there was some overlap between 
the two proposals since both include surveillance of macro-economic aspects, but the 
Sixpack goes further by including sanctions while the Europact is just about political 
commitment.  
  
2.2.1 March 11 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs had sent a letter to parliament, including the agenda 
for the Eurotop. The letter stated that the Europact was going to be discussed and that 
the aim of the pact was to monitor and benchmark, without dictating policies. There 
would be no transfer of sovereignty and the pact had the objective of improving 
competitiveness.52    
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2.2.2 March 23-24 
As usual, the Dutch parliament held a debate prior to the European Council meeting 
of March 23 and 24. The Minister of Finance sent a letter to parliament a few days 
before the debate with a report on the Eurogroup meeting. This letter explained the 
Sixpack and the measures it included, and explicitly stated that the Council is 
expected to agree upon the Sixpack during their next meeting.53 Nevertheless, the 
debate was officially about the upcoming Council meeting and the Europact, even 
though the Europact was already agreed upon and debated earlier that month.  
 Not only could the topic of the debate lead to confusion, the fact that the two 
pacts overlapped and were discussed in a short period of time seemed to have 
confused politicians a little. Mr. Van Bommel (SP), for example, stated that Mr 
Barosso and Mr. Van Rompuy designed the Europact. However, Barosso and Van 
Rompuy designed the Sixpack, while the Europact was a constellation made by 
Merkel and Sarkozy.54 Another example is Mr. Irrgang (SP), who said that macro-
economic imbalances have become a part of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is 
not the case.55 A third example is Ms. Albayrak who suddenly started discussing the 
Sixpack during the debate about the Europact.56 These slight mistakes could just be 
minor errors; Irrgang and Van Bommel were usually the ones being very much aware 
of the content and consequences of the Sixpack and Europact.  
 
2.3 Debate on the State of the European Union 
One of the debates used in this thesis is a debate about the State of the European 
Union [Staat van de Europese Unie]. Every year, the Dutch government publishes a 
document called the State of the European Union, in which it reviews the most 
important developments on the European level and in which it give its vision for the 
next year. Until 2012, the State of the European Union was published in September 
and debated in parliament six months later. From 2012 onwards, the State is published 
in February.57 
 So the State of the European Union 2010-2011 was published in September 
2010 and debated in March 2011. A lot had happened in these six months: the 
European Commission presented the Sixpack, European leaders agreed upon the 
European Stability Mechanism and Ireland and Portugal received bail-out packages.58 
The document was thus slightly outdated by the time parliament finally debated it. In 
the documents, the government for example stated that it was in favour of a macro-
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economic imbalance procedure and stricter rules for government finances, which was 
agreed upon two months before the debate about the State took place.59  
 Nevertheless, the debate is interesting in the context of this thesis. Even 
though the Sixpack and the Europact were already agreed upon, the debate still took 
place in the midst of the Eurocrisis: Portugal just received a bailout package a week 
before the debate and the Sixpack and Europact had been discussed in both the 
document and in the debate. Furthermore, a general debate about the European Union 
shows the priorities of politicians regarding European affairs very well. 
 
 
Chapter 3. The need for deeper European integration 
 
This chapter will examine whether the political parties acknowledged the need for 
deeper European integration. Did they identify a spillover effect caused by the 
decision to create a monetary union without an economic union?  
 
3.1 Parties in favour of deeper European integration  
The most pro-European party in Dutch parliament is D66, the Liberal Democrats. 
They were very much in favour of deeper European integration and were proponents 
of the Europact and the MIP. Mr. Schouw for example argued that the need to transfer 
sovereignty and embark on a more centralized economic policy is a consequence of 
the creation of a European Community.60 In another debate, Mr. Schouw stated that if 
we want to continue with Europe, we have to make ‘a certain decision’ because the 
Euro is not viable without strict economic agreements.61 Another member of D66 
used the same arguments to explain why deeper integration was needed. Mr. 
Koolmees pointed out that the crisis had shown us that just a monetary union is not 
sufficient. The economic side of the EMU deserves more attention and deeper 
European integration is therefore essential for maintaining the Euro.62 Mr. Schouw 
and Mr. Koolmees clearly stated that certain measures were needed as a consequence 
of a previous decision: the creation of a monetary union without an economic union.  
 The same neo-functionalist view was manifest among the politicians of 
GroenLinks, the green party in Dutch parliament. Mr. Van den Berge very explicitly 
showed this view when stating that the euro led to the need to work on a common 
economic policy. ‘The E of Economy in EMU has finally to be realized’ he said.63 
According to Mr. Braakhuis (GroenLinks), the monetary union would not be able to 
function well in the long-term if there was no harmonization of economic policy. His 
political party was therefore very happy about the shift of sovereignty towards 
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Brussels.64 Earlier, Mr. Braakhuis used a metaphor by pointing out that the Greek 
crisis had made clear that the European ‘house’ is not finished yet. There is a 
foundation and there are walls, but the roof is still missing. The roof needs to be 
finished in order to make the euro a stable currency.65  
 A third and more surprising party that showed a neo-functionalist approach 
towards deeper integration was the VVD, the dominant party in the governing 
coalition. Mr. Ten Broeke wondered out loud whether ‘we’ dare to solve the design 
flaws of the monetary union by making agreements and benchmarking economies. 
His own answer was yes, his party dared to embark on deeper integration66 Ten 
Broeke thus identified an earlier policy-decision which consequences made it 
inevitable to take measures nowadays. These three parties were rather in favour of 
deeper integration for the sake of saving the Eurozone. Their politicians argued that 
the measures were needed to solve issues that are a consequence of a previous policy-
decision – this is a clear spillover effect. 
 Interestingly, D66 and the VVD argued that action had to be taken to prevent 
some catastrophic event such as the collapse of the euro. Without the proper reform, 
the monetary union is not viable and is likely to come to an end. Mr. Ten Broeke 
(VVD) for example said that we were on a crossroad, on an existential moment in the 
existence of the European Union, with two major European aspects at stake: the euro 
and Schengen. He argued that the actions taken were going to determine whether the 
euro (and Schengen) will remain a success or will become something of the past.67 
Also Mr. Schouw (D66) talked about the need to reform, arguing that the future of 
Europe is in danger if it fails to reform.68 Furthermore, he said that the European 
project is wavering and that we needed to move forward in order to save the European 
Union. He argued that the Europact is not sufficient and that more European guidance 
on economic and fiscal policies was essential.69 
 
3.2 Parties opposed to deeper European integration  
There were however also parties who identified a spillover effect, but did not seem to 
agree with the need to act on it. Mr. Van Bommel (SP) said there would have been 
much more discussion regarding the creation of the monetary union if it was known 
that the euro would cause Member States to lose competences over their economies. 
He even doubted whether the monetary union would have been created at all if policy 
makers would have had this knowledge. The proposals from Van Rompuy were, 
according to Van Bommel, a step towards an economic government.70 Furthermore, 
Van Bommel pointed out that first a political union has to be created before creating a 
monetary union, but that in the current situation there is a monetary union without a 
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political union; and now ‘the European elite’ is realizing that we also require a 
political union and are trying to achieve this through the backdoor. The existence of 
the monetary union becomes an argument to enforce a political union.71 Also Mr. 
Irrgang, another member of the SP, made such an analysis by stating that the 
European heads of government or state and the European Commission deem a more 
European control over national budget and economic policies more necessary in order 
to prevent another crisis.72  
 Other political parties had similar observations. Mr. Van der Staaij (SGP) 
pointed out that ‘more Europe’ seemed to be inevitable since the crisis: more 
European surveillance, stricter fiscal rules, a stronger economic coordination, and 
now the Europact.73 Another politician, Mr. Van Dijck (PVV), asked the Prime 
Minister why he did not admit that the Europact and the shift of sovereignty were 
desired because otherwise the monetary union cannot survive. Mr. Rutte replied by 
stating that Van Dijck is mistaken and that there is no transfer of sovereignty. It is 
however unclear whether the minister president agreed with the causal connection, 
which implies a spillover effect.74 
 These politicians regarded the need of the crisis measures as a direct 
consequence of a previous decision: the creation of the Economic and Monetary 
Union without a strong economic framework. This is a functional spillover effect. 
Interestingly, these politicians were not in favour of the measures.  
 So there were politicians who were in favour of deeper integration due to the 
inevitable need as a consequence of having a monetary union. Secondly there were 
politicians who identified the idea of a spillover effect, but did not agree with the 
inevitable need of deeper integration. This could be explained by the fact that these 
parties are in general opposed towards European integration. Other parties did not 
mention any spillover effects, but were sceptical towards the Europact and MIP. It is 
interesting is to briefly examine for what reasons the opposing politicians were 
against the measures.75 
 
3.3 The arguments used to oppose monitoring and correcting macro-economic 
developments  
Mr. Plasterk (PvdA) argued that a single country is not able to solve an international 
economic crisis and that we therefore need to take action on a European level. 
However, the centralization of power in Brussels should only take place in matters 
that are relevant for preventing another crisis.76 Mr. Van der Staaij (SGP) opposed the 
measures of the Sixpack, arguing that transferring sovereignty to Brussels is not 
always the best solution. Given the subsidiarity principle, labour market policies and 
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social policies have to remain competences of the Member States.77 Other politicians 
opposed the measures mainly because of the loss of sovereignty, which will be 
discussed later on. 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
First of all it is interesting to note that the politicians who debated about the Europact 
and Sixpack are often not the party leaders, but the economic experts. Only the party 
leaders of the ChristenUnie and SGP participate in the debates, but these are small 
parties that do not have the manpower to have an expert on every policy-issue. The 
fact that most parties did not let their party leaders participate in the debate, implicates 
that the Europact and Sixpack were not regarded very important.  
 A large part of the politicians explicitly identified a spillover effect and thus 
acknowledged a causal connection between deeper European integration during the 
Eurocrisis and the creation of a monetary union without a strong economic union. 
 There was however a fundamental difference. The VVD, D66 and GroenLinks 
regarded deeper European integration as a necessity, while the SP, SGP, and PVV did 
acknowledge the causal connection between the need of deeper integration during the 
Eurocrisis and the lack of a strong economic structure in the EMU, but they did not 
regarded deeper integration as a necessity. The difference in these two viewpoints can 
be explained based on the political ideology of the parties. D66 is in favour of 
European integration and hence in favour of deeper economic integration, while the 
PVV is opposed to European integration and thus against deeper economic 
integration. A better explanation might be that there is a difference in the analysis of 
what caused the Eurocrisis. Parties who regards deeper integration as a necessity most 
likely acknowledged the flaws in the design of the monetary union, while parties who 
oppose might have seen the root of the Eurocrisis only in a weak enforcement of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. The PVV and CU for example only wanted a 
strengthening of the SGP and opposed other measures.78 However, further research 
has to be done in order to draw such conclusions with certainty.  
 Other parties, such as the CDA and PvdA, did not mention any causal 
connection that implies a spillover effect. As the following chapters will show, the 
CDA did not had a strong presence during the debates at all and the PvdA was 
sceptical towards deeper integration, but did not explicitly oppose the Europact and 
the MIP.  
 
 
Chapter 4. The Eurocrisis: an opportunity to reform? 
 
The Eurocrisis is a crisis in multiple ways, such as an economic crisis, a sovereign 
debt crisis and a political crisis. Did politicians use this crisis as an opportunity to 
promote reform? In general there was agreement upon the fact that the current 
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situation was not feasible and that change was required. Politicians however did not 
agree upon what kind of change was needed. Some politicians wanted deeper 
integration in the form of the MIP, others wanted to strengthen the SGP and a few 
wanted to abolish the euro. So in a way all politicians were aware of the Eurocrisis 
and saw it as an opportunity to reform.   
 
4.1 The framing of the Eurocrisis 
The politicians who were in favour of the MIP and the Europact are the most 
interesting and most relevant to examine more closely. The liberal party (VVD) - and 
to a lesser extent the Christian Democrats (CDA) – were framing the Eurocrisis in a 
very particular way. The frame created is similar to the narrative of the southern 
Europeans being lazy, wasting money and retiring early. This in sharp contrast with 
the northern Europeans who works hard and save up their money. So what the 
government and ruling parties basically did was putting emphasis on the crisis of 
confidence: the southern European countries had irresponsible policies and since 
some of these policies affected other Member State, there is a need for European 
surveillance.   
 What makes this framing interesting is that the frame is largely incorrect. The 
increase in budget deficits of southern Member States as a result of the Eurocrisis was 
very large and even if those Member States had a balanced budget prior to the crisis, 
their deficits would still be too large – except for Greece perhaps. The average 
increase of budget deficits for 2009 for Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain was 
11,2% of GDP and their debt increased on average by 51% of GDP between 2007-
2011.79 The frame of southern European countries being lazy and wasting the good 
times is dominated by the case of Greece. The Greeks were the first to require 
financial assistance, which had a lot to do with bad governance: their deficits and 
debts exceeded the Maastricht criteria for years and they covered this up to prevent 
fines. However, Greece is rather unique in this perspective. Ireland for example had 
very sound public finances before the crisis started with a public debt of only 25% of 
GDP in 2007 and a balanced budget; Spain even had a surplus of 2% of 2007. 
Therefore, one can argue that an extraordinary large crisis rather than poor 
governance caused the sovereign debt crisis.80  
 Ms. Blanksma-van den Heuvel (CDA), for example, made a clear distinction 
between the ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ Member States, by stating that economically weak 
countries have been able to benefit disproportionally from the economically strong 
countries.81  Mr. Harbers (VVD) said that southern Europe was able to use northern 
Europe ‘as a casino’, which is something he wants never to happen again. He asked 
the government whether the Sixpack would be able to prevent such behaviour from 
southern European Member States.82 Furthermore, Harbers stated that the countries 
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with financial difficulties did not even have a word in their own language for 
reforming the economy.83 
 Later on, Rutte stated that Greece had not collected taxes for years and that the 
Irish banking sector grew too much relative to the size of the Irish economy, which 
made it impossible to maintain the banking sector.84 These are interesting statements, 
first of all because it frames the Irish and Greeks as irresponsible. Second of all, 
Greece did not collect taxes very effectively, but stating that Greece did not collect 
taxes at all is just factually incorrect. The statement about the Irish banking sector is 
true, the banking sector amounted to nine times the GDP of Ireland in 2009. But the 
banking sector in the Netherlands was, relatively, the second largest in the EU with 
five times the GDP in 2009.85 One could argue that the banking sector in the 
Netherlands grew too large relative to the economy as well. 
 However, Mr. Rutte and Mr. Harbers were not the only ones from the VVD 
who framed the Eurocrisis in this way. Mr Ten Broeke stated peripheral countries 
simply did not follow any rules and now they have to face the consequences. He 
furthermore argued that Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece ‘let themselves be 
overloaded with cheap money that was borrowed at the expense of our good credit 
ratings.’ According to Ten Broeke, this led to a loss of confidence of the financial 
markets in the euro, threatening the Dutch welfare, Dutch pensions and Dutch savings 
directly. Therefore, we needed  to fix the treaties and combat irresponsible behaviour 
of Member States.86   
 So Mr Ten Broeke created a direct causal connection between the 
‘irresponsible behaviour’ of the periphery countries and the risk for Dutch citizens to 
lose their pensions and savings. Furthermore, Ten Broeke made it sound like the 
peripheral countries were the ones to blame for the Eurocrisis and that the 
Netherlands was a victim. This led him to the conclusion that Europe needed new 
agreements in order to make sure that periphery countries would not be irresponsible 
anymore. It is true that Dutch banks and pension funds had a lot of exposure in 
peripheral countries, but every bad investment-loan has a borrower and lender who 
both take part in a high-risk investment. It is doubtful as well whether the panic on the 
financial markets was solely caused by poor policies by the peripheral countries; one 
can argue that the EMU lacked a good mechanism to deal with this problem and 
thereby contributed to the problems. Others might even argue that the policies of 
wage restraint in Germany and the Netherlands were part of the problem as well.87  
 Mr Ten Broeke argued that the Member States who keep on implementing 
unwise policies have to be placed under a different regime. If a Member States takes 
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too much freedom and endangers others, it will be reminded of their responsibilities. 
This advice on matters that are supposed to be – and will maintain – on the national 
level.88 
 
4.2 The expected consequences for the Netherlands 
During the debate, Harbers asked whether the Netherlands was doing enough to 
prevent any trouble with the new rules. Mr Rutte responded to Mr Harbers question 
by stating three times that the Netherlands will most likely never be in a situation 
wherein it has to follow up advice from Brussels. He argued that the Netherlands had 
substantial surpluses on its balance of payments and on its trade balance and that the 
Netherlands was doing very well on the matters that would be included in the MIP.89 
 Mr Van Bommel (SP) very interestingly – and rightfully – pointed out that the 
government indeed stated that Brussels gets more power, but that this only affects the 
southern Member States ‘who made a mess of things’. He argued that the government 
is glad that Brussels is able to interfere with policies of other Member States, as long 
as the Netherlands is not affected by it. Van Bommel warned the government that this 
policy can very well backfire, either by the southern Member States wanting to leave 
the Eurozone or by Brussels forcing policies upon the Dutch government.90 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
One can conclude that the governing parties framed the Eurocrisis in accordance with 
the narrative of irresponsible and lazy southern Europeans who benefit from the 
hardworking, responsible northern Europeans. The governing parties emphasized the 
‘irresponsible policies’ and the ‘poor governance’ in southern European Member 
States and thereby amplified the crisis of confidence. They used this crisis of 
confidence as an argument to be in favour of the introduction of the MIP and 
Europact. The agreements were regarded as a way to monitor and influence southern 
European Member States and to prevent them to enter another crisis, which would 
affect the Netherlands as well. An explanation of why the government might have 
done so is to convince the other, more eurosceptical, parties of the need of the 
Europact and Sixpack.  
 So the Dutch government regarded the Europact and Sixpack as a possibility 
to influence Member States to prevent them from implementing irresponsible policies. 
However, they did not expect the Europact and Sixpack to affect the Netherlands. The 
macro-economic developments in the Netherlands were deemed to be in accordance 
with the MIP and Europact already and the government did not expect the 
Netherlands ever to be in a situation where this would be different. 
 Even though the Dutch economy was doing relatively well, one can expect 
politicians of the opposition parties to be more critical towards such statements. 
Economic prospects can very well deteriorate and the high current account surplus is 
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likely to be criticized by countries with a current account deficit. Furthermore, the 
Dutch economy actually experienced macro-economic imbalances at the time.91 In 
April 2013, the European Commission published an in-depth review to identify 
macro-economic imbalances. In this report, the Commission came to the conclusion 
that the Netherlands was experiencing macro-economic imbalances in the fields of 
private sector debt, the housing market and the large current account surplus. They 
argued that even though such a surplus does not enhance large risks like a deficit, it is 
needs to be monitored. The European Commission came to the same conclusions in 
the reports of 2014, 2015 and 2016.92 
 
 
Chapter 5. Sovereignty and policy-freedom debated 
 
Chapter 3 had shown that most political parties identified a spillover effect from the 
creation of monetary union without a strong economic union. Some of them regarded 
deeper integration as an inevitable necessity, while others were still opposed to deeper 
integration. The following chapter had shown that some politicians used the crisis as 
an opportunity to reform the EMU and deepen economic integration. Both chapters 
showed an element of inevitability. The monetary union is not viable without an 
economic union and since a decision is made to create only a monetary union, we are 
now forced to create an economic union. The Eurocrisis is a window of opportunity 
since the constituents are increasingly eurosceptical and deeper integration will not be 
accepted when there is no crisis to solve.  
  These elements of inevitability – along with the limited power of national 
parliaments on European policies – makes one wonder whether politicians were aware 
of the consequences on macro-economic policies and the loss of sovereignty as a 
result of the introduction of the MIP. Did politicians were in favour of deeper EU 
integration despite the loss of sovereignty and the consequences on macro-economic 
policies? Did politicians oppose deeper integration because of these issues? Or 
haven’t they been aware of the consequences on sovereignty and macro-economic 
policies? 
 This chapter will first of all examines whether politicians were aware of the 
shift in sovereignty that came along with the Europact and MIP. Secondly, this 
chapter focuses on the consequences of the Europact and MIP on macro-economic 
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policies. Thus the first part deals with sovereignty in general and the second part deals 
with specifically the consequences on different socio-economic policies. 
 
5.1 Sovereignty  
As outlined earlier, the main cost of fixing the flaws of the monetary union and 
creating a strong economic governance structure is the loss of sovereignty. This has 
been one of the main topics during the debates about the Europact and Sixpack. Again 
it is important to take into account that there was some overlap in the debates about 
the Europact and the MIP, making it difficult to know whether the politicians talked 
about the Europact or the MIP. Politicians themselves seemed to be a bit confused 
about this as well, as been shown before. 
 
5.1.1 Opposing views on whether a transfer of sovereignty occurs  
The government and the opposition had a contrasting view on whether the 
introduction of the Europact and the MIP would lead to a shift of sovereignty. The 
argumentation used by the opposition was as following: Brussels can set targets for 
macro-economic developments and is able to impose a fine if a government does not 
sufficiently meet the target. The fact that Brussels is able to impose sanctions means 
that it is able to force a government to implement certain policies, which is regarded 
as a loss of policy freedom and a loss of sovereignty.93  
 Mr Irrgang (SP), for example, explicitly stated that the MIP had very far-
reaching consequences because Brussels will be able, due to the possibility to impose 
sanctions, to dictate policies. According to Irrgang, the Prime Minister would be 
misleading parliament if he says that advices from the European Commission on 
wages and pensions are not enforceable. 94 However, this argumentation is only valid 
in the context of the MIP. The Europact is just based on political commitment, while 
the MIP includes sanctions. 
 Prime Minister Rutte had a different view on the question whether the Sixpack 
or Europact would create a shift of sovereignty. He argued that the strengthening of 
the SGP would indeed cause a transfer of sovereignty, but the Macro-economic 
Imbalances Procedure would not. According to his argumentation, the main objective 
is benchmarking the economies. In the worst case scenario, the European Commission 
is only able to set targets in the context of the Macro-economic Imbalances 
Procedure, but it is up to the Member State to decide on how to reach those targets. 
Due to this policy freedom there is no transfer of sovereignty, according to Rutte.95  
  
5.1.2 The possibility of sanctions in the context of the MIP and Europact 
Interestingly, the government has sent a very clear and explicit letter to parliament, 
just days before the debate of March 23, wherein the whole MIP is outlined. The letter 
explained that the procedure aims to address harmful imbalances in the economies of 
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Member State and that this is done by a preventive arm – i.e. reports and 
benchmarking – and by a corrective arm – i.e. recommendations and monitoring of 
progress. If a Member States does not follow the recommendation, its government can 
receive a fine of 0,1% of GPD.96 One might think that such a letter would settle the 
debate on whether there are sanctions and whether the European Commission can use 
these sanctions to dictate policies – i.e. a transfer of policy freedom and sovereignty. 
This was however not the case, as would become clear a few days later during the 
debate of March 23.  
 During this debate, a relevant and interesting discussion took place between 
Mr Irrgang (SP) and Prime Minister Rutte. Mr Irrgang (SP) pointed out that the 
government not only wanted the EU to advise, but also to punish when a Member 
States does not follow the EU advice on how to improve their competitiveness. He 
stated that the Sixpack went further than the Europact and asked whether wages and 
housing prices will be included in the MIP.97  Mr Irrgang furthermore argued that a 
Member State could be advised to work on an issue such as wages or pensions. Once 
the Member State does not follow the advice, it can receive a fine. Irrgang asked 
explicitly whether this was the right interpretation and demanded a clear answer. Mr 
Rutte responded by saying that it is not the right interpretation. He argued that 
Brussels is only able to say that a Member State has to meet certain goals, but the 
Member State can decide for itself on how to do so.98 Mr Irrgang again pointed out 
that a fine would be possible once a Member State does not follow the 
recommendations from Brussels. Again Rutte responded by stating that Europe won’t 
be able to dictate policies. He said that in the context of the Europact, Brussels is not 
able to set targets nor policies. In the context of the MIP, however, Brussels is only 
able to set targets.99 
 Later on in this debate, other politicians continued to discuss the matter of 
sanctions and sovereignty. Mr Van Dijck (PVV) argued that once a Member State is 
committed to the Europact, it could receive sanctions if certain goals were not met. It 
seems like Van Dijck mixed up the Europact and the Sixpack. Rutte, however, uses 
this mix-up very well by pointing out that there is no transfer of competences 
included in the Europact. 100 Later on in the debate, Rutte uses the same trick by 
stating there is no transfer of sovereignty in relation to the Europact. 101 
 Mr Braakhuis (GL) stated that the government would be fined when it does 
not follow the rules that are set out in Europe. Rutte responded by saying that the 
Netherlands will indeed get fined in cases of excessive government debt or budget 
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deficits, but refrains from mentioning the possibility of being fined in the context of 
the macro-economic imbalances procedure.102  
 During the same debate, Mr Slob (CU) asked the Prime Minister whether he 
could confirm that the debt criteria of 60% and the budget deficit criteria of 3% are 
the only two criteria that are committed to and enforceable by law. Rutte replied by 
saying that this is completely correct. 103 In fact this was indeed the case, since the 
Sixpack was not yet agreed upon. But the Sixpack was going to commit Member 
States by law to prevent and correct macro-economic imbalances, although this would 
not include standard criteria.  
 Later on in this debate, the Minister of Finance Jan-Kees de Jager, made an 
interesting remark on the Europact. While Rutte was stating that the Europact did not 
cause a shift of sovereignty because the pact lacks enforceability, De Jager said 
something else completely. He pointed out that the Dutch government was afraid that 
the Europact would become some sort of soft competition pact that would not be 
enforceable.104 This contradicts the statements Rutte made earlier about the pact not 
enhancing a transfer of sovereignty because it lacks enforceability.  
 Prime Minister Rutte has not been entirely clear on the issue of sanctions in 
the context of monitoring and correcting macro-economic developments. He very 
well used the confusion among politicians to avoid admitting the possibility of 
sanctions in the context of the MIP. When Mr Rutte talked about sovereignty, he 
simply did not mention sanctions. Interestingly, the remark of the Minister of Finance 
imply that the government had a different view on monitoring macro-economic 
developments than the one Mr Rutte expressed during the debate.  
 
5.1.3 Opposing a transfer of sovereignty  
Most politicians were rather critical about – and often opposed to – the transfer of 
sovereignty. Mr Slob (CU) for example strongly rejected any move towards a deeper 
political union and stressed that there should not be any kind of transfer of 
sovereignty, which ‘he underlines with a thick line and puts an exclamation mark 
behind’. Instead, Mr Slob wanted strict compliance with the SGP and suitable 
sanctions for the countries that fail to do so.105 Mr Bontes (PVV) was very much 
opposed to any shift of competences or sovereignty towards Europe and argued that 
instead there had to be strict compliance with the SGP and firm sanctions.106 Mr 
Dijkgraaf (SGP) agrees with the idea of benchmarking macro-economic aspects, but 
he opposed the idea of Brussels being able to dictate measures. He wondered whether 
the Netherlands would be able to continue to make its own decisions or whether the 
European Union would limit the policy freedom. His fraction opposed further shifts in 
sovereignty towards the European Union. He explicitly stated that the decision-
making on matters of pensions, labour market and education had to remain on a 
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national level. However, he was not opposed to sanctions when macro-economic 
imbalances are too severe.107 
 Mr Schouw (D66) had a rather unique approach towards the matter of 
transferring sovereignty towards Brussels. He argued that bandwidths, as a result of 
benchmarking, are actually very clear guidelines. This causes a gradual shift towards 
dictating policies by Brussels; when a country is not within the bandwidths it has to 
adjust and in a way therefore loses a part of its sovereignty.108  
 
5.1.4 conclusion 
There was a discussion about whether the Europact and MIP would create a shift of 
sovereignty towards the European Union. The Prime Minister contradicted the letter 
of his minister of finance on the possibility of sanctions in the context of the MIP. 
Throughout the debates, the prime minister remains vague on the ability of Brussels 
to give advice and impose a sanction when the advice is not followed and dodged the 
issue by focussing on the Europact rather than the MIP.  
 He did not acknowledge the possibility that a government can receive a fine 
when it does not follow an advice from the European Commission, which would give 
the European Commission a mechanism to force governments to implement certain 
policies. Important to take into account is that the government had a minority in 
parliament and that the government was not supported by the PVV on the issue of 
European integration. Even though the government did not require the support of 
parliament for the MIP, Rutte was likely to be careful not to get in the bad graces of 
other parties from which he later was going to need the support on the issues that the 
PVV did not support. Many opposition parties – except for D66 and GroenLinks – 
were rather sceptical about transferring sovereignty. Downplaying the consequences 
of the MIP is was possibly a tactic to limit scepticism.   
 
5.2 The consequences for macro-economic policies  
The previous paragraph dealt with the general issue of sanctions and the discussion 
whether the introduction of the Europact and the MIP led to a shift in sovereignty. 
This paragraph will take a closer look at the actual consequences of monitoring and 
correcting macro-economic developments for the policy freedom regarding socio-
economic policies.  
 There was in general a lot of awareness in parliament of the fact that 
monitoring and correcting macro-economic developments would cause a shift of 
sovereignty towards Brussels. Most of them were opposed to this, but a few accepted 
the need for deeper European integration. All of them however were very much aware 
of the contents and consequences of the MIP and Europact for socio-economic 
policies as well. A good example of this is the motion-Slob.  
 On the 14th and 15th of February 2011, there was a meeting of the ECOFIN-
council in which the economic governance structure was discussed. In the conclusions 
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of this meeting, the Council talked about the importance of debt consolidation, 
correcting harmful macro-economic imbalances and the need to implement reforms 
regarding pension systems, health care systems and the labour market.109 Two days 
later, Mr Slob (CU), Mr Irrgang (SP), Mr Plasterk (PvdA) and Mr Dijkgraaf (SGP) 
proposed a motion that pointed out that many important decisions were being taken in 
the upcoming weeks regarding monetary cooperation. They argued that Germany and 
France were trying to work towards a political union under the pretext of more 
coordination. Given their view that the Netherlands had to remain sovereign in 
matters such as pensions, tax-collecting and wages, they asked the government to 
strongly reject any move towards a closer political union and to strive for a 
strengthening of the SGP, including suitable sanctions for those who did not adhere to 
the pact.110  
 The motion clearly points out that these politicians opposed any transfer of 
sovereignty regarding socio-economic policies towards Brussels, as well as creating a 
political union through the backdoor. This motion had been accepted by parliament 
and been referred to a couple of times during the debates, arguing that the government 
either has to live up to the content of the motion or already had done so.  
 Mr Irrgang, being a member of the Socialist Party, was worried about the 
content of the economic advice that Brussels was going to give in the context of the 
Sixpack. He wondered whether the advice was going to include lower wages, 
increasing the retirement age, reforming the pension system and reducing government 
spending, which are all right-wing oriented measures according to Irrgang.111 Mr 
Plasterk, Member of Parliament for the Labour Party, was cautious as well about the 
political orientation of the measures. Mr Plasterk stated that he was in favour of 
improving competitiveness, but he pointed out that at the time, 22 out of 27 heads of 
government/state were right-wing oriented. The Europact, he continued, is rather 
right-wing oriented as well. The pact includes measures such as wage reduction of 
public servants and to make redundancy laws more flexible, but the pact lacks 
investment in education, which is the most important factor for competitiveness 
according to Mr Plasterk.112  
 The two main left-wing parties in Dutch parliament were therefore rather 
sceptical about the introduction of the MIP because of ideological arguments. Another 
reason why most political parties opposed the MIP – and to a certain extent the 
Europact as well – was the potential interference of Brussels with socio-economic 
policies.  
 Ms Albayrak (PvdA) explicitly stated that the Europact actually does include 
wage development, pensions, retirement age, collective bargaining and wage 
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reduction in the public sector and that she was opposed to including these matters in 
the pact. She pointed out that she was in favour of monitoring and benchmarking and 
that she supported all measures that enhance the stability of the Eurozone.113 Later on 
however, Ms Albayrak argued that matters such as employment termination laws, the 
protection of workers, and the pension system had to remain national competences. 
She said this was also the viewpoint of the government and that the Europact does not 
enhance a transfer of sovereignty, since it only includes intergovernmental 
agreements.114  
 Mr Dijkgraaf (SGP) agreed with the idea of benchmarking macro-economic 
developments, but he opposed the idea of Brussels being able to dictate measures. He 
wondered whether the Netherlands would be able to continue to make its own 
decisions or whether the European Union would limit the policy freedom. Dijkgraaf 
explicitly stated that decision-making on matters of pensions, labour market and 
education has to remain on a national level. He opposed a political union and was 
therefore glad that the pact – probably referring to the Europact – does not include 
juridical commitments. 115  Even though Dijkgraaf probably was going to be 
disappointed after reading the Sixpack, he was aware of the macro-economic aspects 
that were at stake.  
 The Liberal Democrats seemed to have been aware of the potential influence 
of Brussels as well. Mr Schouw (D66) argued that there would be a day when the 
Netherlands has to adhere to the new guidelines. Even though he was not explicitly 
listing all the policy-issues that are involved in the Europact, he was aware that 
Brussels some day would be able to dictate a certain policy goal or even a policy 
measure.116 Mr Koolmees (D66) pointed out that in the new economic governance 
pact that would be discussed during the Council meeting – i.e. the Sixpack –, there 
was the objective of correcting macro-economic imbalances and that there was the 
possibility of sanctions.117   
 Mr Bontes (PVV) was opposed to European integration in general, but 
especially towards the Europact. He pointed out as well that the pact enhances wage 
development, pensions and corporate income taxes.118 Also Mr Van Bommel (SP) 
pointed out the ability of the Europact to address issues, such as lower wages and 
‘irresponsibly fast debt reductions’.119 
 Van der Staaij (SGP) argued that the European Commission wanted to have a 
say in working conditions, the labour market, employment termination laws and 
social policies. Even though his party understood this desire, it was opposed to the 
transfer of competences and it wanted these matters to remain a national competence, 
as should be in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Van der Staaij was in 
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favour of a strengthening of the SGP in combination with firm sanctions for the 
Member States who fail to comply, instead of European interference in national socio-
economic policies. The necessary and essential structural reforms were regarded as a 
matter for national governments to deal with. According to Van der Staaij, it was not 
desirable that competences would insidiously be transferred towards Brussels.120  
 Politicians who were in favour of the Europact were less outspoken about the 
content and consequences. Mr Schouw (D66) for example pointed out that guidelines 
could become a way to dictate policies, but that it was a necessity and therefore 
welcomed by his party.121 Another example is Mr Van den Berge (GroenLinks), who 
was in favour of the Europact because he regarded economic governance as 
inevitable.122 Both politicians however lacked to mention any consequences of the 
Europact on the economy and policy freedom. 
 The politicians of the coalition parties, the VVD and the CDA, had a slightly 
different view on the Europact. Mr Ten Broeke (VVD) said that the Europact 
included wage development and competitiveness developments. However, he argued, 
there is not a shift of competences or sovereignty because the Europact works with 
the open method of coordination. It is about benchmarking, not dictating.123 Mr Ormel 
(CDA) said that his party is in favour of the Europact, but it did not regard the pact as 
a major step towards a political union.124 Later on during the debate, Mr Slob asked 
whether the CDA is in favour or against including wages, pensions and taxes in the 
Europact. Mr Ormel refrains from giving a clear answer and only stated that he was 
opposed towards a European tax.125 Both Mr Ormel and Mr Ten Broeke downplayed 
the importance of the Europact, arguing it did not represent a step towards an 
economic union.  
 
5.2.1 Conclusion 
Many politicians have explicitly listed multiple socio-economic policies that could be 
influenced by the MIP, and to a lesser extend by the Europact. Noteworthy is that 
mainly the political parties who opposed the monitoring and correcting of macro-
economic developments were very clear on the content and consequences. The parties 
in favour had been less outspoken on its consequences.  
 As has been set out earlier in this thesis, the Europact is about political 
commitment and there are no sanctions included in the pact. Macro-economic aspects 
will only be monitored and benchmarked. In principle, there is no way Brussels is 
able to interfere with or dictate any social-economic policy. Soft power and peer 
pressure can have some influence, but there is no juridical commitment. The fear of 
the Members of Parliament is therefore, in the case of the Europact, slightly ill-
founded. The politicians of the coalition parties, as well as Prime Minister Rutte, were 
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therefore right in downplaying the importance of the Europact and stating that it does 
not enhance a step towards an economic union. The MIP however provides Brussels 
with a strong mechanism to dictate policies. 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The decision taken by policy-makers in the 1990s to create a monetary union without 
a strong economic pillar has proven to be a poor one. According to economic theory, 
a monetary union requires an economic union in order to function well and be viable 
in the long term. The Eurocrisis has turned this theoretical need into a realistic 
inevitability. This created a functional spillover effect: the decision to establish a 
monetary union forced politicians in the recent years to establish an economic union 
as well.  
 To fix the flaws in the design of the monetary union, political leaders had to 
take serious steps towards an economic union. Furthermore, the Eurocrisis created an 
opportunity to reform the EMU. Deeper economic integration was needed and the 
Eurocrisis was the right moment to embark on it. The consequence however was 
transferring sovereignty towards Brussels and limiting policy-freedom, while the 
constituency was rather Eurosceptic. This generated a policy-dilemma: on the one 
hand there was a strong need for deeper integration, but on the other hand this would 
cost sovereignty and policy freedom, which would be opposed by the constituents 
which the politicians were supposed to represent. 
 The most far-reaching decision taken was macro-economic surveillance, since 
this affects many social-economic policy areas that fall under national competences. 
This research examined how Dutch politicians in parliament dealt with the inevitable 
need to embark on deeper integration at the high cost of transferring sovereignty 
towards Brussels. Both the Europact and Sixpack are relevant in these cases since 
they both include macro-economic surveillance.  
 Most of the politicians acknowledged the need for deeper European economic 
integration. Some argued that the design flaws in the monetary union finally had to be 
fixed while others said that the economic pillar had to be constructed because former 
politicians lacked to do so. The politicians making these remarks – mostly the ones 
from D66, GroenLinks and VVD – were also in favour of the Europact and MIP. 
Some politicians agreed with the need for deeper integration, but saw others measures 
more suitable – even though a strengthening of the SGP would not fix all the design 
flaws of the EMU. A third group simply opposed European integration in general. 
 This division in parliament regarding the need of deeper integration created a 
difficult situation for the government, which had a minority of seats in parliament. 
Therefore, the government was dependent on the opposition for policy-issues that 
were not supported by the PVV. This dependence forced the government to remain in 
the good graces of the other parties, which might be the reason why the prime 
minister downplayed the importance of the Europact and MIP. The opposition 
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towards deeper integration in parliament limited the ‘win sets’ for the government, 
making it difficult to find support on the domestic level for the outcome of 
negotiations on the European level. This however let to a situation wherein the Prime 
Minister contradicted his Minister of Finance and did not acknowledge the possibility 
of fines in the context of the MIP, which is an essential part of the MIP. Although the 
Prime Minister did not explicitly give wrong information, he managed to dodge 
questions and was not completely open about the workings of the MIP.  
 The opposition did continue asking questions about the consequences of 
monitoring and correcting macro-economic developments and the possibility of 
sanctions, but they did not simply quote the report of Van Rompuy or the letter of the 
Minister of Finance. There was sufficient information available to make the Prime 
Minister acknowledge the possibility of sanctions and the consequences of this. 
Furthermore, the opposition did not always knew the difference between the Europact 
and the MIP. 
 The politicians in favour of deeper integration used the Eurocrisis as an 
argument to reform the economic governance structure. Especially the VVD clearly 
emphasized a crisis of confidence. According to them, southern European Member 
States had misbehaved and we were paying the price. European coordination and 
deeper economic integration was supposed to monitor and influence these Member 
States, while they expected that the new rules would not apply for the Netherlands 
since they were doing well enough.  
 In general politicians were very well aware of the potential risks involved in 
the Europact and the Sixpack. Multiple times politicians have said that the measures 
could lead to interference from Brussels on matters such as wages, pensions, housing 
market, health care systems and the labour market. As always, some politicians were 
opposed while others were in favour.  
 Thus politicians in favour of deeper European integration were in favour 
because of the spillover effect and the crisis of confidence, despite the fact that deeper 
integration caused a shift in sovereignty and despite the fact that Brussels would be 
able to influence macro-economic policies. The politicians who opposed deeper 
integration, did so because of the shift in sovereignty and the influence Brussels 
would gain over macro-economic policies. Interestingly, being in favour of deeper 
European economic integration is in accordance with economic theory. Why some 
parties opposed and other were in favour, has most likely to do with ideology and the 
analysis on the causes of the Eurocrisis. But further research has to be done to on this 
issue to draw conclusions with certainty.  
 Parliament dealt with the urgent need of deeper integration at the cost of 
sovereignty in a critical way; they were very much aware of the content and 
consequences of the MIP and Europact and most opposition parties were very 
sceptical or opposed towards transferring sovereignty. However, the Europact and the 
MIP, which created a transfer of sovereignty and gave Brussels the ability to 
influence macro-economic policies, was not regarded sufficiently important to file a 
motion of no confidence or to withdraw the support for the government. 
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Appendix 
Abbreviation Full name Political thought 
VVD Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie Liberals/ conservatives  
CDA Christelijk Democratisch Apel Christian Democrats 
PvdA Partij van de Arbeid Labour Party 
SP Socialistische Partij Socialist 
GroenLinks GroenLinks Greens 
SGP Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij Orthodox Christian 
PVV Partij Voor de Vrijheid Eurosceptic/ populist 
CU Christen Unie Christian Democrats 
